Introduction
The text above was extracted from the annual report of a company that probably would be very well assessed by market agents regarding its corporate governance practices. It is actually, though, an extract of Lehman Brothers Annual Report 2007, the U.S. investment bank that collapsed just a few months after the release of this document.
Like so many other similar cases, Lehman's case illustrates how companies that apparently were role models in their top management practices collapsed due to different reasons such as wrong business decisions, risk management problems or frauds.
The number of corporate scandals 1 associated with corporate governance problems in the first decade of this century is extensive. Wikipedia website, for instance, provides a list of more than 75 corporate scandals throughout this period. 2 Their economic relevance is enormous. [ Table 1 here]
The economic impact of the scandals portrayed in Table 1 on other stakeholders -such as employees, communities, clients, suppliers, etc. -and on society as a whole was indeed much larger. These scandals have come from companies worldwide, including large emerging countries such as Brazil and India and developed economies such as the U.S., Germany and Japan. Although there has been a first wave of corporate scandals in the 2001-2003 period epitomized by Enron and Parmalat in the U.S. and Europe, respectively, the lessons from these cases do not seem to be fully understood, since the list has continued to grow, especially after the emergence of the global financial crisis in 2007-2008. Since the number of corporate scandals associated with corporate governance problems continues to be relevant worldwide, I focus on the following question in this paper: Why do we still see so much value destruction in the business world due to corporate governance failures after years of debate and, in theory, learning about this subject?
I initially argue that governance scandals are the direct outcome of a common set of fourteen interrelated factors detailed ahead such as: excessive concentration of power, ineffective board of directors, passivity of investors, failure of gatekeepers, poor regulation, lack of the right ethical tone at the top, etc.
My central point in this paper, nevertheless, is to argue that the root of the problem lies in the way the corporate governance concept has been internalized by most of the companies, investors and academics worldwide. Based on the work of orthodox economists (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) , corporate governance has been widely grounded on the agency theory perspective, which is basically concerned with creating ways to motivate one party (the "agent"), to act on behalf of another (the "principal"). As a result, the good governance of a business, a very complex subject, has been reduced to a mere set of incentive and control mechanisms in order to induce agents (managers) to make decisions in the best interests of their principals (shareholders).
The limitation of the debate to the theoretical framework of agency theory has at least two fundamental problems. First, the dissemination of corporate governance as a mere set of rewards and punishment mechanisms to be implemented in order to induce behaviors has left business leaders free to treat this complex and intrinsically human subject as a mere checklist of recommended practices to be fulfilled in order to be well perceived by the outside stakeholders. The Lehman Brothers' case is just one among several similar scandals in which there was a discrepancy between the essence of good governance -companies where decisions are made in their best long-term interest and in which people comply with the rules -and the way the governance practices were shown externally.
Second, agency theory -formulated almost forty years ago -is based on the homo economicus premise, a concept that has been proved to be a very limited portrait of the human nature by numerous recent researches (presented ahead) in different fields such as sociology, psychology, neuroscience, behavioral economics, etc.
Specifically, these studies have consistently shown that people are not rational, exclusively selfish, nor interested in breaking rules depending on its relative economic benefits as predicted by the homo economicus concept. Since this accumulated knowledge in other fields cannot be ignored, a rethink of the corporate governance concept is needed in light of these works.
As a result, I argue that a new behavioral approach to corporate governance focusing on the psychological aspects of human beings inside organizations shall emerge. This new approach should be based in at least three main components ignored by agency theory: 1) the systematic focus on the mitigation of cognitive biases in managerial decisions; 2) the continuous fostering of employee and executives awareness towards the promotion of unselfish cooperative behaviors; and, 3) the reduction of the likelihood of frauds and other dishonest acts through new corporate strategies developed after a deeper understanding of their psychological motivations.
This new approach does not dismiss, though, the importance of incentive and control mechanisms recommended by the agency theory. Such mechanisms remain relevant, but
should not be seen as sufficient for well-governed companies. The expansion of the corporate governance literature beyond agency theory towards a behavioral approach should be seen as something crucial to ultimately reduce the emergence of new corporate scandals in the coming years.
This paper relates with different fields of knowledge that provide complementary theoretical frameworks to agency theory, such as the literatures of trust in organizations (Noreen, 1988; Mayer et al. 1995; Schoorman et al., 1996; Bower et al., 1997; De Dreu et al., 1998; Zaheer et al., 1998; Becerra and Gupta, 1999 and Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Cadwell and Karri, 2005) , stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997; Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003; Hernandez, 2012) , and intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Kolev et al. 2012) . Trust literature criticizes agency theory's pessimistic assumptions about the human behavior pointing out that this approach precludes trust and cooperation, crucial elements for successful organizations. It argues that corporate agents may show an attitude of trust and cooperation depending on contextual and personal factors, therefore not always behaving selfishly. Overall, this literature considers trust as an efficient mechanism to maximize the principal's utility. Stewardship theory views executives as "stewards" of the organization who are motivated to act responsibly based on an assumption of trust. It considers that managers obtain greater utility when developing a collaborative approach rather than when behaving selfishly, especially when they identify with organizational values and goals. The literature on motivation points out that nonpecuniary motives shape human behavior, including intrinsic pleasure arising from work, the desire to obtain social approval and the sense of reciprocation. It also contends that extrinsic rewards such as those emphasized by agency theory may indeed undermine the role of intrinsic rewards on motivation and increase agent's opportunistic behavior.
This paper also fits in an emerging line of research that criticizes agency theory's simplistic and inflexible assumptions about human behavior and the narrowness of its predictive validity (Tirole, 2002; Charreaux, 2005; Van Ees et al., 2009; Cuevas-Rodríguez et al., 2012; Martin et al., 2012; Wiseman et al., 2012) . Overall, these works call for new approaches toward corporate governance by widening the agency concept through a behavioral perspective. I believe that this paper contributes to these literatures by prescribing three specific areas of concentration for the emergent behavioral approach to corporate governance based on an analysis of corporate scandals from earlier 21st century as well as on the fragilities of the homo economicus premise evidenced by recent numerous works.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I list the common factors explicitly associated with governance scandals from the first decade of the 21 st century. In section 3, I develop my argument that the root of the problem lies in the homo economicus premise behind the mainstream approach to corporate governance. I do so by presenting evidence from recent researches in different fields that people: i) do not make rational decisions; ii) tend to behave cooperatively instead of acting in a purely selfish way depending on the social context; and, iii) behave dishonestly motivated primarily by psychological factors instead of applicable penalties and the probability of being caught. As a result of this critique, I argue in Section 4 that the conceptual solution for the limitations of agency theory is the emergence of a behavioral approach to corporate governance focusing on psychological factors associated with people inside corporations. Section 5 then provides some concluding remarks. [ Table 2 here]
In Table 3 , I provide a qualitative analysis of each corporate scandal presented in Table 1 vis-à-vis common factors associated with them, aiming to understand the specific relevance of each factor for the selected cases.
[ Table 3 here]
In spite of the limitations of this preliminary aggregate analysis, such as its admittedly subjectivity, Table 3 Based on the work of mainstream economists (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1998) , corporate governance literature has been widely grounded on agency theory, which is basically concerned in creating the most efficient contract to align the interests of one party (the "agent") with those of another (the "principal") in situations where the principal concedes authority to the agent to act on her name.
3
As a result, the good governance of a business, a very complex subject, has been reduced to the implementation of an appropriate set of incentive tools (e.g. stock-based compensation, periodic performance evaluations, etc.) and controls (e.g. independent boards, risk management divisions, compliance programs, internal controls, internal and external audits, etc.) in order to align interests and reduce agency costs.
This approach -deriving from the limited view of the "carrot and stick" that forms the basis of mainstream economics -has left business leaders free to treat this intrinsically human theme as a set of checklists to be fulfilled in a technical way, sometimes totally disconnected from the company's daily management.
Agency theory is based on the usual premise of neoclassical economic models that agents act like homo economicus. This concept, originally coined by critics of John Stuart Mill's work (1836) on political economy (Persky; 4 , assumes that human beings always:
1. Make perfectly rational decisions; 5 2. Think exclusively in maximizing their own personal economic gains 6 ; and, 3 The principal-agent relationship also involves an information asymmetry in favor of the agent, such that the principal cannot directly ensure that the agent always act in her best interest. 4 According to Persky (1995, p. 222) , John Stuart Mill never actually used this designation in his own writings. The term emerged in reaction to Mill's work and initially carried a pejorative connotation reflecting the widespread hostility of the historical school towards his postulation of blatant selfishness. 5 Rationality is defined in the sense that the personal "utility function" is optimized by individuals who seek to attain maximum predetermined goals with minimum possible cost.
3. Are interested in breaking the rules if the applicable penalty multiplied by the probability of being caught is lower than the expected benefit of a dishonest act 7 .
The reduction of people within corporations acting as agents to the concept of homo economicus -an archetype initially applied to economic models created to explain the trading of goods and services in anonymous markets and later indiscriminately extended to other fields -ends up in a very limited and often inaccurate assumption about human behavior.
Hundreds of recent studies in sociology, psychology, neuroscience, behavioral economics, etc. have provided mounting evidence that human behavior is far more complex, depending on psychological, social and biological interactions. 8 Even Jensen (1994a Jensen ( , 1994b , one of the first authors to bridge agency theory with corporate governance, has later acknowledged the inappropriateness of the economic model of human behavior, 9 although he has not corrected the premises underlying his 1976 seminal work in light of such review.
10
These three premises behind mainstream corporate governance based upon the homo economics concept bring with them three respective fundamental problems detailed in the following subsections.
6 Economists tend to argue that they employ the concept of utility instead of economic benefits and that this concept can even include altruistic behavior if defined appropriately. In practice, though, theoretical models usually end up reducing the concept of "utility" into the maximization of economic gains for the decision maker, invalidating this potential defense of the homo economicus approach. 7 This prediction is largely based on the classical work of Nobel Prize winner Gary Becker (1968) . 8 This critique is admittedly not new even in the economics field. Thaler (2000) is one of the earlier critics of the exclusive premise of homo economicus embedded in economic models. At the time of his paper, he already emphasized that it was time for homo economicus to evolve into homo sapiens. 9 Jensen and Meckling (1994a) Thaler and Shefrin (1981) years ago characterized as agency problems with one's self". 10 According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 307) , "We retain the notion of maximizing behavior on the part of all individuals in the analysis to follow".
First problem of mainstream corporate governance based on the homo economicus concept: people do not make rational decisions
Firstly, we are subject to multiple cognitive biases, that is, deviations in judgment patterns taking place in particular situations leading us to distorted interpretations of reality, illogical interpretation, and, consequently, to irrational decisions. This well established body of research has been initiated by Tversky (1974, 1979) , growing exponentially afterwards (Angner and Loewenstein, 2007; Thaler, 2000; Kahneman, 2011) . Nowadays, more than 100 cognitive biases have been identified from researches in cognitive science, social psychology, and behavioral economics 11 . Table 4 below exemplifies some of the main individual and collective cognitive biases, including their potential impacts for the corporate governance debate.
[ Table 4 here]
Among the cognitive biases presented in Table 4 , take the example of the interrelated biases of optimism and overconfidence. People who are overconfident tend to underestimate risks due to an "illusion of control" over the outcomes of their initiatives, while optimists tend to overestimate the future outlook of their outcomes in what is called the "better than average" effect. As a result, even technically qualified executives with interests aligned with those of their shareholders can make disastrous business decisions due to the pronounced presence of these biases.
There is already some evidence of this in the literature. Malmendier and Tate (2004) observe that companies with overconfident CEOs tend to undertake mergers that destroy value. BenDavid et al. (2007) find that companies with overconfident CFOs apply lower discount rates to value cash flows, use more debt, and are less likely to pay dividends. Barros and Silveira (2008) observe that companies run by more optimistic individuals tend to choose more levered financing structures, ending up more indebted. Schrand and Zechman (2011) find that overconfident executives are more likely to initially overstate earnings which start them on the path to growing intentional misstatements or frauds.
These studies illustrate how just one of the several cognitive biases that possibly affect top level managers -overconfidence -may impact relevant corporate decision making.
Therefore, the presence of counterbalances such as independent third-party reviews and the (2011) is showing that people may have a tendency to act in a cooperative and unselfish way, acting in the best interest of the groups to which they belong. In short, these papers, most of them based on experiments, provide systematic evidence of altruistic behaviors fleeing from the orthodox economic view.
Take for instance three experiments that defy the view that people tend to behave like rational economic maximizing individuals: the "trust game", the "ultimatum game", and the "dictator game".
In In the "ultimatum game" (Güth et al. 1982; Dawes and Thaler 1985; Thaler, 1988; Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Nowak et al. 2000; Sanfey et al. 2003; Oosterbeek et al. 2004; Koenigs, 2007 any amount proposed by A (since rationally anything is better than nothing). However, different researches (Güth et al. 1982; Kahneman et al., 1986; Hoffman et al., 1996a; Oosterbeek et al. 2004 ) observe that, on average, people tend to offer "fair" splits (with a modal offer around 50:50), whereas offers of less than 20% are usually rejected.
The "dictator game" (Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Bolton et al. 1988; Diekmann, 2004; Henrich et al. 2004; Bardsley, 2008 ) is a variant of the ultimatum game. In it, player A, "the dictator" or proposer, determines a split of some monetary endowment. Player B then simply receives the remainder of the endowment left by the proposer. Player B's role is entirely passive, with no strategic input into the outcome of the game. If individuals are only concerned with their own economic well being, dictators would allocate the entire money to themselves, giving nothing to player B. Experimental results (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994; Hoffman et al., 1996b; ) indicate that individuals often allocate money to the responders, voluntarily reducing the amount of money they receive.
The overall result of experiments such as those presented is that people frequently do not act like rational maximizers as predicted by the homo economicus model. On the contrary, people usually tend to show a cooperative behavior based on reciprocity and altruism. More importantly, since human behavior is flexible rather than rigid as presumed by the homo economics model, this tendency can be reinforced through situational factors that create the right social context in order to increase cooperation rates. Stout (2011) 12 argues that unselfish prosocial (or cooperative) behavior, including voluntary compliance with legal and ethical rules, is triggered by the social context, which in turn depends on three main social variables 13 :
12 Stout (2011, p. 98 ) calls this "a three-factor approach to social context". 13 Fostering the "activation" of people's conscience as an important corporate governance practice has one limitation, however. About 1% to 4% of the general population is comprised of people with psychopathy disorder, unable to feel guilt or empathy for others. There are suspicions that this percentage is higher in corporate environments, especially at top hierarchical levels. As a result, cultivating conscience will not work with people subject to this disorder, an especially relevant observation for organizations headed by these psychopath individuals.
1. The instructions received by leaders, deriving from our tendency to obey authorities (Sally, 1995; Balliet, 2010) ; 2. The reciprocity, or beliefs about the prosocial behavior of others when facing similar circumstances, as a result of our propensity to conform and imitate the behavior of our peers (Gintis, 2000; Henrich et al. 2001; Gintis et al. 2003; López-Pérez, 2009 ); and, 3. The magnitude of the perceived benefits of one's actions on others, deriving from our tendency to feel empathy (Eisenberg and Miller, 1987; Eisenberg and Fabes, 1990; Batson and Powell, 2003; Decety and Jackson, 2004; Batson, 2009 ).
Since rational choice models ignore the influence of these three key elements on human behavior, the traditional view of corporate governance based on incentives and controls do not contemplate the need to continuously activate and cultivate people's consciousness in corporations in order to induce cooperative and long-term oriented behaviors. showing that the propensity of people to act dishonestly -at the root of relevant scandals -is more dependent on psychological factors than on both the risk of being caught by breaking the rules and its applicable penalty. Overall, there is evidence that at least ten psychological factors seem to be relevant for people's decision to incur into dishonest behavior:
Third problem of mainstream corporate governance based on the
1) The ability to rationalize its own dishonest acts ( Similarly to the two previous sections, none of these psychological factors are addressed in mainstream corporate governance thinking, which departs from the premise that increased monitoring and tougher penalties are the sole elements to avoid unlawful behaviors.
The proposed solution for reducing the frequency of scandals: the need for a behavioral approach to corporate governance focusing on psychological factors
Since the assumptions behind the mainstream corporate governance theory do not hold, the mere implementation of incentive and control mechanisms, although relevant, will not be sufficient to ensure well governed companies. In fact, this may largely explain the collapse of companies that apparently adopted good governance practices.
The missing link in order to ensure well-governed companies over time is to focus on the human factor, that is, on the creation of corporate environments in which intrinsically motivated people want by themselves to make decisions in the best long-term interest of the company as well as follows the rules. Table 5 below summarizes this argument by presenting a comparison between the traditional view of corporate governance and the new proposed approach based on behavioral aspects.
[ Table 5 here]
To do this, business leaders must unceasingly devote their time to create social contexts in their organizations that: 1) improve the managerial decision-making process by creating a system with effective checks and balances that reduce cognitive biases; 2) continuously fosters employee and executive conscience by promoting unselfish long-term oriented cooperative behaviors; and, 3) reduce the propensity to dishonest acts by creating new strategies such as enhanced internal controls based on a deeper understanding of their psychological motivations.
Probably, the hardest part of this process towards de facto good corporate governance will be to change the mindset of business leaders themselves. On the one hand, cases such as the Lehman Brothers debacle have shown that top executives have been indoctrinated to think exclusively in their own short-term economic outcomes without concerns about their impact on other stakeholders. On the other hand, reducing cognitive biases in organizations depends on an effective system of checks and balances, which implies a certain decentralization of power, something not necessarily welcomed by leaders who are comfortable in maintaining their status quo and the modus operandi of their decisions.
Concluding remarks
The emergence of numerous high-profile corporate scandals in the early years of the 21 st century with huge impacts on societies worldwide evidence that the corporate governance debate must evolve in order to ensure de facto well-governed companies, that is, those in which decisions are made in their best long-term interest and in which people comply with the rules.
In this paper, I argue that the dissemination of corporate governance as a mere set of internal and control mechanisms in order to induce behaviors has led some companies to internalize this complex and intrinsically human subject as a mere check-list of recommended practices to be fulfilled in order to be well perceived by the outside stakeholders. As a result, I provide a critique of the traditional corporate governance literature based on the agency theory, since the acceptance of this approach by companies, academics and regulators worldwide as the sole relevant issue for the corporate governance debate has clearly failed to ensure well governed companies. It is time to move beyond the limited assumption of the homo economicus for corporate governance. Psychological issues associated with the human factor within corporations should become the new focus of corporate governance analysis.
14 The term "behavioral corporate governance" has already been used by Charreaux (2005) and Van Ees et al. (2009) . Their point of view for this term, however, is different than the one adopted in this paper. 15 In this sense, I agree with Jensen's view (1994b, p. 14) The company has overstated its profits by more than $1 billion as well as kept billions in debt off its balance sheet. It also pursued a failed aggressive strategy of acquisitions resulting in significant losses for its shareholders. The company concealed losses by paying $687 million to advisers on acquisitions. The company is also accused of siphon another $1.5 billion through offshore funds.
Total Estimated losses $751 billion 
Passivity of investors
Investors do not correctly exercise their role as active shareholders, and end up wrongly rewarding firms with unsustainable practices by inflating their stock prices.
Failure of gatekeepers
Reputational intermediaries such as auditors, stock analysts, credit rating agencies, attorneys, investment banks, and consultants who pledge their reputational capital to vouch for information that investors cannot verify fail in their duties.
Poor Regulation
Poor or nonexistent regulation allows the occurrence of governance problems.
Mediating Cause
Illusion of success of the business People inside and outside the organization come to believe that the company is an absolute success, ignoring contrary evidence and generating a feeling of invincibility.
Internal atmosphere of greed and arrogance
An internal atmosphere of euphoria and hubris creates an inner sense of superiority to people outside the company.
Lack of ethical tone at the top
Leaders clearly fail to promote high ethical standards within their organizations, not treating the issue as something essential and priority.
Corporate governance seen as a marketing tool
The company clearly seeks to meet the check-list of recommended governance practices without actually embracing the theme at its core prior to the emergence of the scandals. 
Immediate Cause
Overexpansion of the business
Excessive growth of the company in the years immediately preceding the governance problems, especially via acquisitions, contribute to the scandal.
Biased strategic decisions
Unintentionally bad top level strategic decisions are made due to cognitive biases such as overconfidence, groupthink, information cascades, etc.
Inflated Financial Statements
The company intentionally publishes doctored financial statements, often inflating its profits or hiding its debts.
Weak internal controls
The main components of a sound internal control system are missing, such as an adequate control environment, effective risk management and control activities.
Inadequate compensation system
A compensation system too aggressive and too connected to short-term goals substantially contributes to governance problems. 3 Individual
Irrational escalation of commitment
Propensity to increase the investment in a decision -based on cumulative prior investment -despite new evidence suggesting that the cost of continuing the decision outweighs its expected benefit.
Attachment to initiatives and projects that did not work and should be rationally treated as sunk funds.
4 Individual Normalcy bias Tendency to underestimate the possibility of the occurrence of disasters that never occurred, as well as inability to cope with disasters once they occurs.
Reduced investment in risk management initiatives dealing with risks that have high impact but low probability of occurrence.
5 Individual Planning Fallacy Propensity of people to underestimate how long they will take to complete a task, even if they have previous experience in similar tasks.
 Project delays;  Unrealistic promises to stakeholders.
Individual Gambler's Fallacy
Tendency to think that the probability of future events is altered by past events, even when the events are independent and the probability remains the same.
Belief that the results of past projects below expectations will be "naturally" offset by results of future projects, even when they are independent activities. 7 Individual Curse of knowledge Difficulty of people with a lot of knowledge about a topic to think about problems from the perspective of lesser-informed agents.
 Release of products difficult to understand by consumers;  Dissonance between the strategic vision of top management and that of the rest of Assigning blame to others, with negative impacts on meritocracy and employee motivation.
17 Individual Egocentricity bias Tendency for people to claim more responsibility for themselves for the results of a joint action than an outside observer would credit them.
Excessive centralization of power, reduced motivation of employees.
18 Individual Hindsight bias Propensity to see past events as more predictable than they actually were before they took place ("I knew-it-all-along" effect).
Memory distortion in the analysis of past decisions (such as non-recognition of exogenous events) could make it very difficult to distinguish bad decisions from bad outcomes, ending up, for instance, in unfairly attribution of blame.
Individual Anchorage
Tendency of people to rely too heavily, or "anchor" on one trait or piece of information when making decisions, even if it has no direct relationship with the subject under review.
Wrong decisions due to the availability of initial information that distorted the analysis.
Collective
Herd behavior, conformity, and information cascades
Tendency of group members -especially those with less information for decision -to observe the actions and initial opinions of others and then make the same choice that the others have made, independently of their own private opinion.
Loss of the group collective wisdom, with decisions being made according to the specific interests of individuals more knowledgeable about the subject under analysis.
Collective Groupthink
Trend excessively homogeneous groups to minimize conflict and reach consensus at any cost, ignoring external ideas that may contradict the dominant view.
Possibility of more extreme decisions by the group, with rejection of good outside opinions. Erroneous assignment of blame to others, maintenance of the status quo. Mainstream view: Corporate governance as a mere set of incentive and control mechanisms in order to make agents (managers) act in the best interest of their principals (shareholders)
Conceptual root: The reduction of the human being to homo economicus Premise Reality (based on numerous recent researches)
1. People always make perfectly rational decisions. People are subject to multiple cognitive biases, leading us to make irrational decisions, both individually and in groups.
2. People think exclusively in maximizing their own personal gain.
People usually tend to act in a cooperative and unselfish way, sacrificing their own personal economic gains in favor of others.
3. People are always interested in breaking the rules if the applicable penalty multiplied by the probability of being caught is lower than the expected benefit of the dishonest act.
Psychological factors are much more important motivators for the decision to break the rules than the probability of being caught or the applicable penalty. 
Conclusion

